Cryptlet proofing services

ABSTRACT

Proof onions for transactions for smart contracts are stored. Details of the transactions are stored on blockchains separate from the proof onions. The proof onions are evidence structures for the steps taken to create any transaction for the smart contract. The proof onions include a plurality of signatures or other cryptographic proofs. A proof request that is associated with at least a first transaction of the transactions is received. A first proof onion of the proof onions that corresponds to the first transaction is retrieved. A plurality of public keys associated with the first proof onion is obtained. The plurality of public keys is used to validate the first proof onion. In response to the validation of the first proof onion, the proof request is responded to with at least an indication of the validity of the first transaction.

BACKGROUND

Blockchain systems have been proposed for a variety of application scenarios, including applications in the financial industry, health care, IoT, and so forth. For example, the Bitcoin system was developed to allow electronic cash to be transferred directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. A bitcoin (e.g., an electronic coin) is represented by a chain of transactions that transfers ownership from one party to another party. To transfer ownership of a bitcoin, a new transaction may be generated and added to a stack of transactions in a block. The new transaction, which includes the public key of the new owner, may be digitally signed by the owner with the owner's private key to transfer ownership to the new owner as represented by the new owner public key.

Once the block is full, the block may be “capped” with a block header that is a hash digest of all the transaction identifiers within the block. The block header may be recorded as the first transaction in the next block in the chain, creating a mathematical hierarchy called a “blockchain.” To verify the current owner, the blockchain of transactions can be followed to verify each transaction from the first transaction to the last transaction. The new owner need only have the private key that matches the public key of the transaction that transferred the bitcoin. The blockchain may create a mathematical proof of ownership in an entity represented by a security identity (e.g., a public key), which in the case of the bitcoin system is pseudo-anonymous.

SUMMARY OF THE DISCLOSURE

This Summary is provided to introduce a selection of concepts in a simplified form that are further described below in the Detailed Description. This Summary is not intended to identify key features or essential features of the claimed subject matter, nor is it intended to be used to limit the scope of the claimed subject matter.

Briefly stated, the disclosed technology is generally directed to smart contracts. In some examples, a proof onion, e.g., layers of cryptographic proof or evidence, for smart contract transactions is stored. In some examples, details of the transactions are stored on blockchains separate from the proof onions. In some examples, the proof onions are evidence structures for the steps taken to generate a particular transaction. In some examples, the proof onions include a plurality of proofs like digital signatures, but can include other types of evidence like zero knowledge proofs zkSnarks, range proofs, etc. In some examples, the plurality of proofs includes at least one enclave attestation from a first enclave. In some examples, the first enclave is a secure execution environment. In some examples, a proof request that is associated with at least a first transaction of the transactions is received. In some examples, a first proof onion that corresponds to any subsequent transaction is retrieved. In some examples, a plurality of public keys or verification challenges associated with the first proof onion is obtained. In some examples, the plurality of public keys is used to validate the first proof onion. In some examples, in response to the validation of the first proof onion, the proof request is responded to with at least an indication of the validity of the first transaction.

Other aspects of and applications for the disclosed technology will be appreciated upon reading and understanding the attached figures and description.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Non-limiting and non-exhaustive examples of the present disclosure are described with reference to the following drawings. In the drawings, like reference numerals refer to like parts throughout the various figures unless otherwise specified. These drawings are not necessarily drawn to scale.

For a better understanding of the present disclosure, reference will be made to the following Detailed Description, which is to be read in association with the accompanying drawings, in which:

FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating one example of a suitable environment in which aspects of the technology may be employed;

FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating one example of a suitable computing device according to aspects of the disclosed technology;

FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a system;

FIG. 4 is a block diagram illustrating an example of the system of FIG. 3; and

FIGS. 5A-5B illustrate an example dataflow for a process, in accordance with aspects of the present disclosure.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The following description provides specific details for a thorough understanding of, and enabling description for, various examples of the technology. One skilled in the art will understand that the technology may be practiced without many of these details. In some instances, well-known structures and functions have not been shown or described in detail to avoid unnecessarily obscuring the description of examples of the technology. It is intended that the terminology used in this disclosure be interpreted in its broadest reasonable manner, even though it is being used in conjunction with a detailed description of certain examples of the technology. Although certain terms may be emphasized below, any terminology intended to be interpreted in any restricted manner will be overtly and specifically defined as such in this Detailed Description section. Throughout the specification and claims, the following terms take at least the meanings explicitly associated herein, unless the context dictates otherwise. The meanings identified below do not necessarily limit the terms, but merely provide illustrative examples for the terms. For example, each of the terms “based on” and “based upon” is not exclusive, and is equivalent to the term “based, at least in part, on”, and includes the option of being based on additional factors, some of which may not be described herein. As another example, the term “via” is not exclusive, and is equivalent to the term “via, at least in part”, and includes the option of being via additional factors, some of which may not be described herein. The meaning of “in” includes “in” and “on.” The phrase “in one embodiment,” or “in one example,” as used herein does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example, although it may. Use of particular textual numeric designators does not imply the existence of lesser-valued numerical designators. For example, reciting “a widget selected from the group consisting of a third foo and a fourth bar” would not itself imply that there are at least three foo, nor that there are at least four bar, elements. References in the singular are made merely for clarity of reading and include plural references unless plural references are specifically excluded. The term “or” is an inclusive “or” operator unless specifically indicated otherwise. For example, the phrases “A or B” means “A, B, or A and B.” As used herein, the terms “component” and “system” are intended to encompass hardware, software, or various combinations of hardware and software. Thus, for example, a system or component may be a process, a process executing on a computing device, the computing device, or a portion thereof.

Briefly stated, the disclosed technology is generally directed to smart contracts. In some examples, proof onions for transactions for smart contracts are stored. In some examples, details of the transactions are stored on blockchains separate from the proof onions. In some examples, the proof onions are evidence structures for the steps taken to create any transaction for the smart contract. In some examples, the proof onions include a plurality of signatures or other cryptographic proofs. In some examples, the plurality of proofs includes at least one enclave attestation from a first enclave. In some examples, the first enclave is a secure execution environment. In some examples, a proof request that is associated with at least a first transaction of the transactions is received. In some examples, a first proof onion of the proof onions that corresponds to the first transaction is retrieved. In some examples, a plurality of public keys or verification challenges associated with the first proof onion is obtained. In some examples, the plurality of public keys or verification challenges is used to validate the first proof onion. In some examples, in response to the validation of the first proof onion, the proof request is responded to with at least an indication of the validity of the first transaction.

In some examples, a cryptlet is a code component that can execute in a secure environment and be communicated with using secure channels. One application for cryptlets is smart contracts. In some examples, a smart contract is computer code that partially or fully executes and partially or fully enforces an agreement or transaction, such as an exchange of money and/or property, and which may make use of blockchain technology. Rather than running the logic of a smart contract in the blockchain itself, in some examples, the logic may instead be done by cryptlets executing off of the blockchain. In some examples, the blockchain is still involved in other manners, such as in tracking the state, and receiving the output of the cryptlet.

Some or all of the cryptlet code may be associated with a constraint to execute in a secure environment. Accordingly, some of the cryptlet code may be run in an enclave. In some examples, an enclave is an execution environment, provided by hardware or software, that is private, tamper resistant, and secure from external interference. In some examples, outputs from the cryptlet code are signed by at least the host enclave's private enclave key of an enclave key pair stored by the host enclave. Data may be enveloped in multiple such layers of digital attestations (e.g., signatures) signed by the data producer or “on-behalf of” a user or IOT device, cryptlet, its host enclave and, then the blockchain connector, which is four layers of signatures in this example. This layering may be referred to as a proof onion. In some examples, the proof onion is verified via public IDs to verify the attestations.

In some examples, rather than storing the proof onion on the blockchain along with each transaction, the proof onions may be stored on a proofing service. Each transaction stored on the blockchain may include a reference to the corresponding proof onion, such as a hash of the transaction.

Subsequent requests can be made to validate one or more transactions stored on the blockchain. The reference to the proof onion, possibly along with other information, may be used to request the validation of one or more transactions from the proofing service. The proofing service may in turn respond to the request by revalidating one or more transactions according to the request. In some examples, the proofing service may return a proof report as a customer-friendly report that revalidates the proof onion against the transaction without disclosing the transaction details or other encapsulated or reference data. In this way, the payload(s) of the smart contract can be verified without disclosing any private details.

Illustrative Devices/Operating Environments

FIG. 1 is a diagram of environment 100 in which aspects of the technology may be practiced. As shown, environment 100 includes computing devices 110, as well as network nodes 120, connected via network 130. Even though particular components of environment 100 are shown in FIG. 1, in other examples, environment 100 can also include additional and/or different components. For example, in certain examples, the environment 100 can also include network storage devices, maintenance managers, and/or other suitable components (not shown). Computing devices 110 shown in FIG. 1 may be in various locations, including on premise, in the cloud, or the like. For example, computer devices 110 may be on the client side, on the server side, or the like.

As shown in FIG. 1, network 130 can include one or more network nodes 120 that interconnect multiple computing devices 110, and connect computing devices 110 to external network 140, e.g., the Internet or an intranet. For example, network nodes 120 may include switches, routers, hubs, network controllers, or other network elements. In certain examples, computing devices 110 can be organized into racks, action zones, groups, sets, or other suitable divisions. For example, in the illustrated example, computing devices 110 are grouped into three host sets identified individually as first, second, and third host sets 112 a-112 c. In the illustrated example, each of host sets 112 a-112 c is operatively coupled to a corresponding network node 120 a-120 c, respectively, which are commonly referred to as “top-of-rack” or “TOR” network nodes. TOR network nodes 120 a-120 c can then be operatively coupled to additional network nodes 120 to form a computer network in a hierarchical, flat, mesh, or other suitable types of topology that allows communications between computing devices 110 and external network 140. In other examples, multiple host sets 112 a-112 c may share a single network node 120. Computing devices 110 may be virtually any type of general- or specific-purpose computing device. For example, these computing devices may be user devices such as desktop computers, laptop computers, tablet computers, display devices, cameras, printers, or smartphones. However, in a data center environment, these computing devices may be server devices such as application server computers, virtual computing host computers, or file server computers. Moreover, computing devices 110 may be individually configured to provide computing, storage, and/or other suitable computing services.

In some examples, one or more of the computing devices 110 is an IoT device, a device that comprises part or all of an IoT support service, a device comprising part or all of an application back-end, or the like, as discussed in greater detail below.

Illustrative Computing Device

FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating one example of computing device 200 in which aspects of the technology may be practiced. Computing device 200 may be virtually any type of general- or specific-purpose computing device. For example, computing device 200 may be a user device such as a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a tablet computer, a display device, a camera, a printer, or a smartphone. Likewise, computing device 200 may also be server device such as an application server computer, a virtual computing host computer, or a file server computer, e.g., computing device 200 may be an example of computing device 110 or network node 120 of FIG. 1. Computing device 200 may also be an IoT device that connects to a network to receive IoT services. Likewise, computer device 200 may be an example any of the devices illustrated in or referred to in FIGS. 3-5, as discussed in greater detail below. As illustrated in FIG. 2, computing device 200 includes processing circuit 210, operating memory 220, memory controller 230, data storage memory 250, input interface 260, output interface 270, and network adapter 280. Each of these afore-listed components of computing device 200 includes at least one hardware element.

Computing device 200 includes at least one processing circuit 210 configured to execute instructions, such as instructions for implementing the herein-described workloads, processes, or technology. Processing circuit 210 may include a microprocessor, a microcontroller, a graphics processor, a coprocessor, a field-programmable gate array, a programmable logic device, a signal processor, or any other circuit suitable for processing data. Processing circuit 210 is an example of a core. The aforementioned instructions, along with other data (e.g., datasets, metadata, operating system instructions, etc.), may be stored in operating memory 220 during run-time of computing device 200. Operating memory 220 may also include any of a variety of data storage devices/components, such as volatile memories, semi-volatile memories, random access memories, static memories, caches, buffers, or other media used to store run-time information. In one example, operating memory 220 does not retain information when computing device 200 is powered off. Rather, computing device 200 may be configured to transfer instructions from a non-volatile data storage component (e.g., data storage component 250) to operating memory 220 as part of a booting or other loading process.

Operating memory 220 may include 4^(th) generation double data rate (DDR4) memory, 3^(rd) generation double data rate (DDR3) memory, other dynamic random access memory (DRAM), High Bandwidth Memory (HBM), Hybrid Memory Cube memory, 3D-stacked memory, static random access memory (SRAM), or other memory, and such memory may comprise one or more memory circuits integrated onto a DIMM, SIMM, SODIMM, or other packaging. Such operating memory modules or devices may be organized according to channels, ranks, and banks. For example, operating memory devices may be coupled to processing circuit 210 via memory controller 230 in channels. One example of computing device 200 may include one or two DIMMs per channel, with one or two ranks per channel. Operating memory within a rank may operate with a shared clock, and shared address and command bus. Also, an operating memory device may be organized into several banks where a bank can be thought of as an array addressed by row and column. Based on such an organization of operating memory, physical addresses within the operating memory may be referred to by a tuple of channel, rank, bank, row, and column.

Despite the above-discussion, operating memory 220 specifically does not include or encompass communications media, any communications medium, or any signals per se.

Memory controller 230 is configured to interface processing circuit 210 to operating memory 220. For example, memory controller 230 may be configured to interface commands, addresses, and data between operating memory 220 and processing circuit 210. Memory controller 230 may also be configured to abstract or otherwise manage certain aspects of memory management from or for processing circuit 210. Although memory controller 230 is illustrated as single memory controller separate from processing circuit 210, in other examples, multiple memory controllers may be employed, memory controller(s) may be integrated with operating memory 220, or the like. Further, memory controller(s) may be integrated into processing circuit 210. These and other variations are possible.

In computing device 200, data storage memory 250, input interface 260, output interface 270, and network adapter 280 are interfaced to processing circuit 210 by bus 240. Although, FIG. 2 illustrates bus 240 as a single passive bus, other configurations, such as a collection of buses, a collection of point to point links, an input/output controller, a bridge, other interface circuitry, or any collection thereof may also be suitably employed for interfacing data storage memory 250, input interface 260, output interface 270, or network adapter 280 to processing circuit 210.

In computing device 200, data storage memory 250 is employed for long-term non-volatile data storage. Data storage memory 250 may include any of a variety of non-volatile data storage devices/components, such as non-volatile memories, disks, disk drives, hard drives, solid-state drives, or any other media that can be used for the non-volatile storage of information. However, data storage memory 250 specifically does not include or encompass communications media, any communications medium, or any signals per se. In contrast to operating memory 220, data storage memory 250 is employed by computing device 200 for non-volatile long-term data storage, instead of for run-time data storage.

Also, computing device 200 may include or be coupled to any type of processor-readable media such as processor-readable storage media (e.g., operating memory 220 and data storage memory 250) and communication media (e.g., communication signals and radio waves). While the term processor-readable storage media includes operating memory 220 and data storage memory 250, the term “processor-readable storage media,” throughout the specification and the claims whether used in the singular or the plural, is defined herein so that the term “processor-readable storage media” specifically excludes and does not encompass communications media, any communications medium, or any signals per se. However, the term “processor-readable storage media” does encompass processor cache, Random Access Memory (RAM), register memory, and/or the like.

Computing device 200 also includes input interface 260, which may be configured to enable computing device 200 to receive input from users or from other devices. In addition, computing device 200 includes output interface 270, which may be configured to provide output from computing device 200. In one example, output interface 270 includes a frame buffer, graphics processor, graphics processor or accelerator, and is configured to render displays for presentation on a separate visual display device (such as a monitor, projector, virtual computing client computer, etc.). In another example, output interface 270 includes a visual display device and is configured to render and present displays for viewing. In yet another example, input interface 260 and/or output interface 270 may include a universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter (“UART”), a Serial Peripheral Interface (“SPI”), Inter-Integrated Circuit (“I2C”), a General-purpose input/output (GPIO), and/or the like. Moreover, input interface 260 and/or output interface 270 may include or be interfaced to any number or type of peripherals.

In the illustrated example, computing device 200 is configured to communicate with other computing devices or entities via network adapter 280. Network adapter 280 may include a wired network adapter, e.g., an Ethernet adapter, a Token Ring adapter, or a Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) adapter. Network adapter 280 may also include a wireless network adapter, for example, a Wi-Fi adapter, a Bluetooth adapter, a ZigBee adapter, a Long Term Evolution (LTE) adapter, or a 5G adapter.

Although computing device 200 is illustrated with certain components configured in a particular arrangement, these components and arrangement are merely one example of a computing device in which the technology may be employed. In other examples, data storage memory 250, input interface 260, output interface 270, or network adapter 280 may be directly coupled to processing circuit 210, or be coupled to processing circuit 210 via an input/output controller, a bridge, or other interface circuitry. Other variations of the technology are possible.

Some examples of computing device 200 include at least one memory (e.g., operating memory 220) adapted to store run-time data and at least one processor (e.g., processing unit 210) that is adapted to execute processor-executable code that, in response to execution, enables computing device 200 to perform actions.

Illustrative Systems

FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a system (300). System 300 may include network 330, as well as participant devices 311 and 312, member devices 341 and 342, counterparty devices 316 and 317, validation nodes (VNs) 351 and 352, enclaves 371 and 372, cryptlet fabric devices 361 and 362, key vault 365, and proofing service 467, which all may connect to network 330.

Each of the participant devices 311 and 312, counterparty devices 316 and 317, member devices 341 and 342, VNs 351 and 352, cryptlet fabric devices 361 and 362, and/or key vault 365 may include examples of computing device 200 of FIG. 2. FIG. 3 and the corresponding description of FIG. 3 in the specification illustrates an example system for illustrative purposes that does not limit the scope of the disclosure.

Network 330 may include one or more computer networks, including wired and/or wireless networks, where each network may be, for example, a wireless network, local area network (LAN), a wide-area network (WAN), and/or a global network such as the Internet. On an interconnected set of LANs, including those based on differing architectures and protocols, a router acts as a link between LANs, enabling messages to be sent from one to another. Also, communication links within LANs typically include twisted wire pair or coaxial cable, while communication links between networks may utilize analog telephone lines, full or fractional dedicated digital lines including T1, T2, T3, and T4, Integrated Services Digital Networks (ISDNs), Digital Subscriber Lines (DSLs), wireless links including satellite links, or other communications links known to those skilled in the art. Furthermore, remote computers and other related electronic devices could be remotely connected to either LANs or WANs via a modem and temporary telephone link. Network 330 may include various other networks such as one or more networks using local network protocols such as 6LoWPAN, ZigBee, or the like. Some IoT devices may be connected to a user device via a different network in network 330 than other IoT devices. In essence, network 330 includes any communication technology by which information may travel between participant devices 311 and 312, counterparty devices 316 and 317, member devices 341 and 342, VNs 351 and 352, cryptlet fabric devices 361 and 362, enclaves 371 and 372, and/or key vault 365. Although each device or service is shown connected as connected to network 330, that does not mean that each device communicates with each other device shown. In some examples, some devices/services shown only communicate with some other devices/services shown via one or more intermediary devices. Also, although network 330 is illustrated as one network, in some examples, network 330 may instead include multiple networks that may or may not be connected with each other, with some of the devices shown communicating with each other through one network of the multiple networks and other of the devices shown communicating with each other with a different network of the multiple networks.

In some examples, VNs 351 and VN 352 are part of a blockchain network. In some examples, VNs 351 and 352 are devices that, during normal operation, validate and process submitted blockchain transactions, and execute chaincode. In some examples, member devices 341 and 342 are devices used by members to communicate over network 330, such as for communication between a member and its corresponding VN, for example to endorse a VN. In some examples, participant devices 311 and 312 are devices used by participants to communicate over network 330, such as to request a transaction.

In some examples, counterparty devices 316 and 317 are devices used by counterparties or as counterparties to a smart contract that makes use of a contract cryptlet via the cryptlet fabric (where the cryptlet fabric includes, e.g., cryptlet fabric device 361 and cryptlet fabric device 362). Counterparty devices 316 and 317 may each be, represent, and/or act on behalf of a person, company, IoT device, smart contract, and/or the like.

Proofing service 367 may be used to store proofing structures associated with transactions performed by the blockchain network of which VNs 351 and 352 are a part, and may used to revalidate the transactions at a later time.

An example arrangement of system 300 may be described as follows. In some examples, enclaves 371 and 372 are execution environments, provided by hardware or software, that are private, tamper resistant, and secure from external interference. Outputs from an enclave are digitally signed by the enclave. Cryptlet fabric devices 361 and 362 are part of a cryptlet fabric that provides runtime and other functionality for cryptlets, as discussed in greater detail below. Key vault 365 may be used to provide secure persistent storage for keys used by cryptlets for identity, digital signature, and encryption services.

System 300 may include more or less devices than illustrated in FIG. 3, which is shown by way of example only.

Illustrative Device

FIG. 4 is a block diagram illustrating an example of system 400, which may be employed as an example of system 300 of FIG. 3. System 400 may include participant devices 411 and 412, counterparty devices 416 and 417, member devices 441 and 442, blockchain network 450, cryptlet fabric 460, enclaves 470, key vault 465, and proofing service 467.

In some examples, during normal operation, blockchain network 450 may validate and process submitted blockchain transactions. In some examples, member devices 441 and 442 are devices used by members to communicate with blockchain network 450. In some examples, participant devices 411 and 412 are devices used by participants to communicate with blockchain network 450, such as to request a transaction. In some examples, enclaves 470 are execution environments, provided by hardware or software, that are private, tamper resistant, and secure from external interference. In some examples, outputs from an enclave are digitally signed by the enclave. Key vault 465 may be used to provide secure persistent storage for keys used by cryptlets for identity, digital signature, and encryption services.

In some examples, counterparty devices 416 and 417 are devices used by counterparties or as counterparties to a smart contract that makes use of, inter alia, a contract cryptlet via cryptlet fabric 460. Counterparty devices 416 and 417 may each be, represent, and/or act on behalf of a person, company, IoT device, smart contract, and/or the like, as discussed in greater detail below.

Blockchain network 450 may include a number of VNs. In some examples, each member of blockchain network 450 may, via a member device (e.g., 441 or 442), maintain one or more VNs in blockchain network 450. Participants may request, via participant devices (e.g., 411 or 412) for transactions to be performed by blockchain network 450. During normal operation, VNs in blockchain network 450 validate and process submitted transactions, and execute logic code.

Transactions performed by the blockchain network 450 may be stored in blockchains. In some examples, blockchains are decentralized ledgers that record transactions performed by the blockchain in a verifiable manner. Multiple transactions may be stored in a block. Once a block is full, the block may be capped with a block header that is a hash digest of all of the transaction identifiers within a block. The block header may be recorded as the first transaction in the next block in the chain, thus creating a blockchain.

A blockchain network may also be used for the processing of smart contracts. In some examples, a smart contract is computer code that partially or fully executes and partially or fully enforces an agreement or transaction, such as an exchange of money and/or property, and which may make use of blockchain technology. Rather than running the logic of a smart contract in the blockchain itself, the logic may instead, with assistance from cryptlet fabric 460, be done by cryptlets executing off of the blockchain network 450. In some examples, a cryptlet is a code component that can execute in a secure environment and be communicated with using secure channels. In some examples, cryptlet fabric 460 is configured to provide runtime and other functionality for cryptlets.

In some examples, Cryptlet Fabric 460 is a server-less cloud platform that provides core infrastructure for middleware that enables blockchain-based applications with increased functionality. In some examples, Cryptlet Fabric 460 is comprised of several components providing the functionality for an enhanced security envelop of blockchain application into the cloud as well as a common application program interface (API) that abstracts the underlying blockchain and its nuance from developers.

In some examples, Cryptlet Fabric 460 manages scale, failover, caching, monitoring, and/or management of cryptlets, as well as a run time secure key platform for cryptlets that allows for the creation, persistence, and hydration of private keys at scale. (“Hydration” refers to the activation and orchestration in memory from persistent storage.) This allows cryptlets to create, store and use key pairs in a secure execution environment to perform a variety of functions including, for example, digital signatures, ring signatures, zero knowledge proofs, threshold, and homomorphic encryption.

When a smart contract runs, the execution of the smart contract may be accompanied by one contract proxy running in Cryptlet Fabric 460 for each underlying ledger that the smart contract persists the transactions to. In some examples, each contract proxy is blockchain-specific. In some examples, each contract proxy translates generic, contract-specific messages into blockchain-implementation, contract-specific transactions. In some examples, the contract proxies record the transactions to blockchain network 450 and other blockchain networks and/or distributed transactional ledgers.

In some examples, transactions performed by cryptlets executing off of the blockchain network 450 are each encapsulated in a proofing structure, such as a proof onion, that may be used to validate the transaction. The proof onion and the validation of the proof onion is discussed in greater detail below. Before the transaction is recorded in blockchain network 450, a cryptodelegate in cryptlet fabric 460 may be used to validate the transaction based on the proofing structure. In some examples, transactions are stored by blockchain network 450 by the contract proxy without the proofing structure. In some examples, the proofing structure for each transaction is instead communicated to proofing service 467 by the contract proxy, where proofing service 467 then stores the proofing structure. In some examples, proofing service 467 is an off-chain storage service that maybe used to store proofing structures. In some examples, transactions recorded on blockchain network 450 can be validated by communication with the proofing service 467 to retrieve and revalidate the proofing structure for the transaction.

In some examples, a cryptlet may be a software component that inherits from base classes and implements interfaces that provide cryptographic primitives and integrations for distributed trust applications. In some examples, it is sufficient for developers to know the base classes and how to implement required and optional interfaces for cryptlets to develop on the platform. Established software development frameworks, patterns, and designs can be used for user interfaces and integration into existing systems.

Types of cryptlets may include utility cryptlets and contract cryptlets. Utility cryptlets usually perform external data integration via events internal or external, provide data access or reusable logic to blockchain smart contracts, but can also provide service level APIs for other systems to work with blockchains. Utility cryptlets whose primary purpose is to inject attested data into blockchains may be called “oracle” cryptlets. In some examples, contract cryptlets contain smart-contract-specific logic that counter-parties signing the contract agree to. Both types of cryptlets may provide a blockchain facing API and a Surface level API.

Regardless of how a smart contract is implemented, utility cryptlets may be used to provide information and additional computation for smart contracts in reusable libraries. These libraries may be used to create a framework for building distributed applications and exposed in a common way via the Cryptlet Fabric 460 in both public and private cloud, and in blockchain environments.

Contract cryptlets may redefine the implementation of the logic that a smart contract executes. In some examples, these cryptlets prescribe that any logic be run off-chain, using the underlying blockchain as a database.

Utility cryptlets may provide discrete functionality like providing external information, e.g., market prices, external data from other systems, or proprietary formulas. These may be called “blockchain oracles” in that they can watch and inject “real world” events and data into blockchain systems. Smart contracts may interact with these using a Publish/Subscribe pattern where the utility cryptlet publishes an event for subscribing smart contracts. The event triggers may be external to the blockchain (e.g., a price change) or internal to the blockchain (e.g., a data signal) within a smart contract or operation code.

In some examples, these cryptlets can also be called directly by other cryptlets within the fabric and expose an external or surface level API that other systems can call. For example, an enterprise Customer relationship management (CRM) system may publish an event to a subscribing cryptlet that in turn publishes information to a blockchain in blockchain network 450 based on that information. Bi-directional integration may be provided to smart contracts and blockchains through Cryptlet Fabric 460 in this way.

Contract or control cryptlets may represent the entire logic or state in a contractual agreement between counter parties. In some examples, contract cryptlets used in smart contract-based systems can use the blockchain ledger to authentically store a contract's data using smart contract logic for data validity, but surrogate logic to a contract cryptlet providing “separation of concerns” within an application's design. The relationship between an on-chain smart contract and a contract cryptlet may be called a trust relationship.

For non-smart-contract-based systems, in some examples, contract cryptlets perform logic and write their data to the blockchain without the smart contract or well-defined schema on the blockchain.

In essence, in some examples, contract cryptlets can run the logic of a contractual agreement between counterparties at scale, in a private secure environment, yet store its data in the underlying blockchain regardless of type.

In some examples, a cryptlet has common properties regardless of type:

Identity—For example, a key pair. The identity can be created by the cryptlet itself or assigned. The public key is also known as the cryptlet address in some examples. The private key may be used to sign all transactions from the cryptlet. Private keys may be stored in the KeyVault 465 or otherwise fetched via secure channel when rehydrating or assigning identity to a cryptlet.

Name—A common name that is mapped to the address for a more readable identity in some examples.

Code—code written in a language that's its Parent Container supports in some examples.

CryptletBindings—a small list of bindings that represent the client (e.g., blockchain contracts or accounts) addresses and parameters for the binding in some examples.

Events—List of events published or watched by the cryptlet in some examples. These event triggers can be watched blockchain data or events or external in some examples.

API—A set of surface level APIs that non-blockchain systems or other cryptlets can use as well as subscriber call back methods in some examples.

Parent Container—A cryptlet container that the cryptlet runs in, in some examples.

Manifest—simple JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) configuration settings for a cryptlet that is used for deployment into the fabric, in some examples.

A cryptlet container may provide a runtime for Cryptlets to execute in. Cryptlet containers may provide abstractions for Cryptlets like I/O, security, key management, and runtime optimization.

Cryptlet containers may provide secure key storage and retrieval for cryptlets to use for identity, digital signatures and encryption. Cryptlets may automatically store and fetch keys via the cryptlet container which integrates with the key vault 465 via a secure channel or CryptletTunnel.

A cryptlet may declare in the manifest its configuration, enclaving, type, etc. In some examples, the cryptlet container ensures that the dependencies the cryptlet needs are in place for it to run.

Enclave requirements for a cryptlet may be set in the cryptlet manifest or in policy. In some examples, enclave options and configuration are set in the cryptlet container service, which is part of Cryptlet Fabric 460 in some examples.

In some examples, the cryptlet container service is the hub of the Cryptlet Fabric 460. In some examples, the primary duties and components of the cryptlet container service are:

-   -   Cryptlet Fabric Registry, which is the Registry and Database for         configuration.         -   The Cryptlet Fabric Registry may be stored on a relational             distributed ledger, which is a distributed ledger that is             relational like a traditional relational database. The             Cryptlet Fabric Registry may include identifiers, versions             where relevant, and other attributes for various registered             smart contract components, such as schemas, counterparties,             contract logic, external sources, other contracts, contract             proxies, networks, and/or the like. A counterparty or             counterparties wanting to compose a contract may do so from             the registered smart contract components. The desired             components can be composed into a relational data structure             that represents the smart contract template, and that is             stored in the Cryptlet Fabric Registry. The Cryptlet Fabric             Registry may include other attributes for the registered             smart contract components, such as the following for             cryptlets, ledgers, and smart contracts, respectively:             -   Cryptlets: Name and ID, Surface Level API, and Events                 they expose to blockchain networks.             -   Blockchains or other distributed transactional ledgers:                 Network Name, Type, Node List, metadata. In some                 examples, the transactional ledgers are distinct from                 the relational distributed ledger on which the Cryptlet                 Fabric Registry is stored.             -   Smart contracts: on-chain smart contract addresses and                 application binary interfaces (ABIs) or other interface                 definition that subscribe to or have trust relationships                 with Cryptlets as well as the host blockchain network.     -   CryptletBindings, which is a collection of all bindings the         fabric serves. A CryptletBinding may map smart contracts to         cryptlets or cryptlets to cryptlets for validation and message         routing. A CryptletBinding may represent a single binding         between a smart contract and a cryptlet (or pair/ring). Details         about the binding like subscription parameter(s), interface         parameter(s), and/or smart contract address are used to route         messages between cryptlets, their clients, smart contracts, or         other cryptlets.     -   Secure Compute Registry: is a registry of enclaves and their         attributes like capabilities, version, costs, and configuration.         Enclave pool definitions of clusters and additional         cryptographic services provided by Enclave Pools like key         derivation, ring signatures, and threshold encryption.     -   Cryptlet Catalog, which may be a REpresentational State Transfer         (REST) API and/or Web Site for developers to discover and enlist         cryptlets into their applications either for a smart contract         binding or for use in building a user interface or integration.     -   API for abstracting blockchain transaction formatting and         Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, Durability (ACID) delivery         append transactions and read queries from cryptlets and any         other system wanting “direct” access to the underlying         blockchain. This API can be exposed in various ways, e.g.,         messaging via service bus, Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs), and/or         REST.

Cryptlets, blockchains, counterparties, schemas, contract proxies, networks, and smart contracts may get registered with the cryptlet fabric registry service. The cryptlet container service may publish the Cryptlet Catalog for on-chain smart contract, front end user interface (UI) and systems integration developers discover and use cryptlets. Developers using the service level APIs may interact with the blockchain via cryptlets and not be concerned or even necessarily know they are working with blockchain data. User Interfaces and Integrations to other systems may interact with cryptlet surface level APIs to rapidly integrate and build applications.

The Cryptlet Fabric Registry may also include all of the public keys for all of the smart contracts associated with all of the template smart contract data structures stored in the Cryptlet Fabric Registry, so that a public key can be retrieved from the Cryptlet Fabric Registry in response to a request that include an identifier and version for the public key.

Enclaves may be hardware or software. For example, a software enclave can be formed by running a hypervisor or Virtual Secure Machine (VSM). An example of a hardware enclave is a secure hardware enclave such as SGX from Intel. A hardware enclave may have a set of keys that are burned/etched onto the silicon than can be used to sign output from the enclave to serve as an attestation to its secure execution. Usually, there is a 1-1 ratio of code and the enclave it runs in. However, in the cloud, cryptlets may be instantiated dynamically and may or may not get the same hardware enclave.

In some examples, enclave resources are pooled together and categorized based on their capabilities. For example, there may be VSM enclaves and hardware enclaves which may have different performance or memory enhancements over time. Cryptlets may be configured to request any enclave or a specific type of enclave and potentially a higher performance hardware enclave at runtime.

In some examples, enclaves are secure execution environments where code can be run in an isolated, private environment and the results of the secure execution can be attested to have been run unaltered and in private. This means that secrets like private keys can be created and used within an enclave to sign transactions and be proved to third parties to have run within an enclave.

In some examples, to deliver cryptlets at scale, enclaves are pooled by the Cryptlet Fabric 460 upon receiving an enclave pool request. In some examples, an enclave pool acts as a resource where, upon receiving an enclave request for a cryptlet, an enclave can be fetched from the enclave pool by Cryptlet Fabric 460 and allocated to a cryptlet at runtime based on the requirements of that cryptlet.

For example, a policy can be set that all cryptlets running a smart contract between counterparty A and B always requires an SGX V2 Enclave from Intel. Alternatively, the enclave requirement may be left unspecified, so that the least cost (e.g., in terms of money, time, already active, etc.) enclave is provided.

Enclaves 470 are registered within the enclave pool. In some examples, an enclave pool shared signature is generated for the enclave pool, where the enclave pool shared signature is derived from the private key of each enclave in the enclave pool. In some examples, pool management uses just-in-time (JIT) instantiation of enclaves to use them when active, but return them to the pool as soon as the work is done. In some examples, a cryptlet that has an asynchronous lifespan and that will not complete its work can release its enclave at a checkpoint and be re-instantiated in a different enclave. In some examples, switching enclaves produces different attestations that can be validated by the enclave pool shared signature.

In some examples, when a set of enclaves is registered with the Cryptlet Fabric 460, each enclave public key is recorded in the enclave pool registry. In some examples, the characteristics are recorded upon registration and can be modified for pool categories that are not inferred from the hardware. In some examples, once all the enclaves are registered, the keys for all enclaves are used to generate a key pair for the pool which is stored in the Key Vault 465.

At runtime, the CryptletContainerService may determine cryptlets runtime environment dependencies based on its registration or policy and request an enclave out of the enclave pool. The enclave pool may activate an enclave and return its address to the CryptletContainerService, which may then inject the appropriate CryptletContainer. In some examples, the CryptletContainer is provided the cryptlet ID and an active binding, which CryptletContainer uses to fetch the cryptlet binary from secure storage, and run a hash code signature check on the cryptlet, which may be a part of the cryptlet's composite identifier. In some examples, the CryptletContainer then fetches any keys required by the cryptlet from the KeyVault 465 and passes them along with the active cryptlet binding into the constructor of the cryptlet to instantiate it within the enclave. In some examples, cryptlet code executes in the enclave, and the payload is digitally signed by the private key of the enclave.

Once a cryptlet is done with its synchronous work, it may call its checkpoint method which may pass any new keys generated during its session for the CryptletContainer to persist in the Key Vault 465 as well as release the cryptlet's enclave back to the pool. By returning the enclave, the enclave then becomes available again to be used by another cryptlet.

In some examples, if a Cryptlet requires an enclave that is not available and will not be available within a defined call window, an error is logged, and an exception is thrown.

New enclaves may be added to the enclave pool, which will generate a new shared signature for the pool. In some examples, a shared signature is used when a cryptlet's lifetime spans multiple enclaves and continuity of attestation needs to be established. In some examples, the shared signature is historical, so if a cryptlet is attested across multiple enclaves, the shared signature is checked, and if the current signature does not match, the previous version of the signature is checked until a match is found. In these examples, if no match is found, the attestation chain is not valid.

In this way, in these examples, a rogue enclave cannot contribute to a validated transaction. In these examples, if a rogue enclave contributes to a transaction, the shared enclave signature would not be made, and the attestation chain would not be valid.

In some examples, the cryptlet container service has a Blockchain Router that provides the abstraction API for data operations against blockchains. Each different type of blockchain may have a Blockchain Message Provider or Connector that is plugged into the blockchain router for proper message formatting for each blockchain.

In some examples, blockchain connectors have a valid address on each of the blockchains the blockchain connector serves and signs transactions with the key for this address. In some examples, blockchain connectors run within an enclave for transaction-signing purposes.

The Blockchain router depends on CryptletBindings for routing messages to the appropriate blockchain connector. The blockchain connector uses the CryptletBinding information to format the messages correctly and to ensure delivery to the targeted recipient.

In some examples, the cryptlet binding is a data structure that provides the abstraction between the cryptlet and underlying blockchain, smart contracts, and accounts. The cryptlet binding may or may not be secured itself, as it may only contain identifier(s) of bound components (e.g., unique identifier(s)) that authorized parties use to look up details from other services. In some examples, used in routing messages, the binding provides the cryptlet ID and the Smart Contract ID itself. In some examples, the smart contract address is looked up and is bound to a specific Blockchain ID that maps to a node address.

Data may be enveloped in multiple layers of digital attestations (e.g., signatures) signed by the data producer or “on-behalf of” a user or IOT device, cryptlet, its host enclave and, then the blockchain connector. This layering may be referred to as a proof onion.

The CryptoDelegate, which is a portion of cryptlet fabric 460 in some examples, may provide an optimization point for verifying these layered signatures before passing on to be validated by all of the nodes, accordingly reducing redundant signature checks, rejecting invalid attestation chains, and/or freeing compute resources. After the CryptoDelegate verifies the layered signatures, the data may be passed from the CryptoDelegate to the contract proxy corresponding to the transactional ledger or blockchain to which the data is to be recorded.

Key Vault 465 may provide secure persistent storage of keys used by cryptlets for identity, digital signatures and encryption services. Cryptlet containers may provide abstractions to cryptlets for storing and fetching keys at runtime. In some examples, a secure communication channel, called a CryptletTunnel, is established between the KeyVault 465 and the enclave that is hosting the CryptletContainer. In some examples, storage and retrieval of private keys and secrets used by hosted cryptlets are provided automatically and on demand by the CryptletContainer.

For instance, in some examples, when a cryptlet is instantiated within its CryptletContainer host, if its identity is established by a key pair in the key vault, the CryptletContainer will securely fetch and provide the key pair to the cryptlet upon instantiation. Or, if the cryptlet creates its own or a new key pair, these new keys may be automatically stored by the CryptletContainer when the Cryptlet deactivates. In some examples, the cryptlet can then use the private key to sign transactions and messages for delivery. One example of an assigned key is a cryptlet that signs transactions as a specific counter party, corporation, user, or device, to a Smart Contract with the counter party's private key.

In some examples, cryptlets can request keys or secrets from their container for other cryptographic services like encryption, decryption, and signing of messages. In some examples, keys used by cryptlets, either for identity or other cryptographic purposes, are looked up and located by the CryptletContainer using the CryptletBinding that resolves to either a Cryptlet Instance ID or a CounterpartyId and requesting or storing via the CryptletTunnel to KeyVault 465. In some examples, a CryptletBinding Key Graph is used to record key locations for resolving and locating keys for a different counterparty in a separate Key Vault 465 instance that may be controlled by that counterparty. Key derivation for multiple Cryptlet Identities from a single counterparty may provide multiple concurrence instances to be distinguished. Also, in example scenarios for one-time use key derivation scenarios where Key Vault 465 issues or a cryptlet creates a derived key for cryptlet signing, when the signing is done, the derived key is destroyed as it was only in enclave memory. Key life cycle services such as key expiration and reset may be provided as utilities.

Besides Key Vault 465, a cryptlet tunnel may be established between an enclave and any suitable Hardware Security Module (HSM)-Key Vault 465 is but one example of an HSM to which the enclave may establish a cryptlet tunnel.

In some examples, a cryptlet tunnel is dynamically established between a Hardware Security Module (e.g., Key Vault 465) and an enclave for the purposes of securely transmitting private keys or secrets that are stored in the HSM to the cryptlet running within the enclave. This may also allow cryptlets to create new keys in an enclave and store them to an HSM securely through the tunnel. In some examples, secrets may be exchanged in both directions (enclave to HSM and HSM to enclave). In some examples, the cryptlet tunnel is created at runtime via the enclave and HSM securely sharing session keys to construct a short-lived tunnel for the exchange of these keys for the active cryptlet. In some examples, the keys that are fetched into an enclave via the cryptlet tunnel are only in enclave memory are destroyed when the cryptlet is closed or faulted.

In some examples, an intermediary device may be used in the cryptlet tunnel rather than directly connecting the HSM and the enclave. For instance, in some examples, a host virtual machine of the enclave is used as a broker, in which the host virtual machine brokers the connection for the enclave, although the decryption is still performed in the enclave itself.

In some examples, a user may have a user token that can be passed and mapped to a key in Key Vault 465. When activities associated with the user are performed in an enclave, the user's key may be fetched from Key Vault 465 using a cryptlet tunnel, e.g., in order to sign on behalf of the user using the user's key. Use of the cryptlet tunnel may allow the key to be communicated securely between the enclave and Key Vault 465.

In some examples, once the secure tunnel is in place, the enclave requests the cryptlet keychain. The cryptlet keychain may include the key pair for the cryptlet that is used for signing and/or executing the payloads created by the cryptlet. The cryptlet keychain may also include a key pair for any counterparties (e.g., user, IoT device) that the cryptlet can “sign on behalf of”). The cryptlet may also include any secrets defined in the contract binding, such a shared secret between counterparties or a single party such as contract terms that a party or parties do not want visible on the blockchain.

Once the enclave keychain is obtained, the instance of the cryptlet may be provided, and the cryptlet may be provided with the cryptlet's keychain and binding in the constructor or initialization. In some examples, the cryptlet executes the cryptlet code and any output is/can be signed by the private keys in the cryptlet keychain. In some examples, the payload is then handed to the CryptletContainer for the enclave signature to be created around that payload providing the enclave attestation. The signatures may be part of a proof onion. For instance, in some examples, the proof onion may include a signature by the enclave key, a signature by the cryptlet key, a signature by a blockchain-specific key, and a signature of another enclave, resulting in a four-layer proof onion proving a chain of proof with four layers of attestation in these examples.

As discussed above, a cryptlet's lifetime may span multiple enclaves. In some examples, the secure cryptlet tunnel provides a way of persisting secrets across multiple enclaves, in that each enclave can communicate with an HSM that persistently stores the secrets.

A secure tunnel between an HSM and an enclave is discussed in detail above. Such secure tunnels can be established between an enclave and another enclave in the same manner as discussed above between an HSM and an enclave. A secure tunnel between an enclave and another enclave may be used to allow cryptlets to exchange secrets with each other at runtime. Among other applications, this may be used for enclaves in ring and pair topologies for secure communications between enclaves in the topology.

In some examples, developers can construct their smart contracts using objects against their logic and simply persist their object state into the blockchain ledger without having to write a smart contract schema. In some examples, the reverse is also true, and an object model can be built and mapped from an existing smart contract schema. This environment may provide blockchain portability and ease of development for blockchain solutions. In some examples, smart contract components can be reused by registering them then in the Cryptlet Fabric Registry. In some examples, developers can also construct their smart contracts using smart contract components registered in the Cryptlet Fabric Registry.

In some examples, the CryptoDelegate is a set of capabilities that are delivered differently based on the underlying blockchain or ledger. In some examples, the CryptoDelegate is part of Cryptlet Fabric 460. In some examples, the CryptoDelegate functions, in essence, as a client-side or node-side integration for the Cryptlet Fabric 460. Among other things, the CryptoDelegate may perform attestation checks on messages before delivery to the underlying node platform, e.g., blocking invalid transactions before they get propagated around blockchain network 450.

As discussed above, when an enclave pool is formed, the enclaves in the pool may be registered with the enclave pool. In some examples, when the enclaves are so registered with Cryptlet Fabric 460, each enclave public key may be received by Cryptlet Fabric 460 and each enclave public key may be recorded in the enclave pool registry. Additionally, as part of the process that occurs when an enclave pool is formed, an enclave pool shared key may be derived from the public key of each enclave in the enclave pool by Cryptlet Fabric 460. A new enclave pool shared key may be generated by Cryptlet Fabric 460 if the membership of the enclave pool changes.

A cryptlet can request an enclave from an associated enclave pool in response to a need. The request may specify a particular size or type of enclave. For example, some types of enclaves are more secure than others, and may be associated with a greater cost, and so an enclave having a particular level of security may be requested according to the particular request. When the request is made, a suitable enclave can be fetched by Cryptlet Fabric 460 from the enclave pool and allocated to the cryptlet based on the particular request.

Cryptlet code that is be executed in an enclave can then be executed in the allocated enclave. As part of the execution of the cryptlet code, the cryptlet code may generate a payload in the host enclave. The payload of the host enclave can then be signed and/or encrypted by the cryptlet private key as well as digitally signed by the private enclave key of the host enclave. The host enclave can then be deallocated from the first cryptlet, so that the cryptlet is no longer running in the enclave, and the enclave is available for other cryptlets. The payload can be attested to out-of-band from the blockchain, e.g., with the public key of the cryptlet and the public key of the enclave. The CryptoDelegate may be used to attest the payload prior to recording, and payload may be re-attested upon request at a subsequent time by proofing service 467.

In some cases, the cryptlet code may also be run in another enclave. For instance, in some examples, as discussed above, pool management may use “just-in-time” (JIT) instantiation of enclaves, but return them to the pool after the work is done. In some examples, a cryptlet that has an asynchronous lifespan and that will not complete its work can deallocate its enclave at a checkpoint.

Accordingly, a different suitable enclave may be fetched from the enclave pool by Cryptlet Fabric 460 and the cryptlet may be re-instantiated in the new enclave. The cryptlet may then continue to execute in the other host enclave (e.g., the new enclave). The payload of the other host enclave can then be digitally signed by the private enclave key of the other host enclave. The other host enclave can then be deallocated so that the cryptlet is no longer running in the enclave, and the other host enclave made available for other cryptlets.

In some examples, the cryptlet may be executed by still more enclaves, such as by at least a third enclave in a similar manner as described above for the second enclave.

Because the cryptlet in this example is executed in more than one enclave, the output of the cryptlet code may contain two or more digital signatures which each originate from the private key of different enclaves from the enclave pool, in addition to a digital signature originating from the private cryptlet key, as well as possibly other digital signatures as part of the proof onion. In some examples, the digital signatures that originate from an enclave key from an enclave that belongs to the enclave pool can all be validated by comparing them against the shared enclave pool key. In some examples, the verification of digital signatures may be performed by the cryptodelegate of the cryptlet fabric. Reverification of signal signature upon request at a subsequent time may be performed by proofing service 467.

In some examples, cryptlet code is packaged as a cryptlet that has its own identity that is a composite of multiple components. In some examples, the cryptlet identity is the combination of the binary hash of the compiled cryptlet, the cryptlet public key, and the binding identifier.

In some examples, the cryptlet identity being composed of these three components allows for a single binary to be compiled and reused across many instances of that contract type.

For an example, for a cryptlet binary financial contract that is an Interest Rate Swap, in one example, the Swap cryptlet would have a hash+public key that uniquely represents that cryptlet binary in the fabric. In this example, when a new Interest Rate Swap is created, an instance of that contract is created represented by a binding Id. In some examples, the binding represents the properties/rules of the Swap instance, such as the identities of the counter parties, where the cryptlet gets interest rate pricing from and how often, and/or the like.

In this way, there may be numerous instances of an Interest Rate swap with a single binary cryptlet executing each of these contracts. The unique instance is the composite cryptlet identity that represents the contract in this example.

Accordingly, in some examples, the combination of three components, (1) Binary Hash, (2) Cryptlet Public Key, and (3) Binding Id, is the instance identifier which is then represented by a version stamp, which in some examples is a hash digest for contract that is recorded on the blockchain ledger representing the version of logic controlling the smart contract. This cryptlet identity may be used regardless of whether or not enclave pool is used and regardless of whether or not the shared key is used. In some examples, an instance of a cryptlet consists of the at least three components (1) Binary Hash, (2) Cryptlet Public Key, and (3) Binding Id, where a general cryptlet that has not been instantiated consists of two components: (1) Binary Hash and (2) Cryptlet Public Key, and where a particular instantiation of that cryptlet would then add the binding Id of that instance of the cryptlet to generate the cryptlet identity for that instance of the cryptlet.

Cryptlets may be installed and registered in cryptlet fabric 460. During the process of installing a cryptlet in fabric 460, cryptlet fabric 460 fetches the cryptlet binary for the cryptlet being installed, and generates a hash of the cryptlet binary. Cryptlet fabric 460 may also request key vault 465 to create a key chain that may include, among other things, a key pair for the cryptlet, where the key pair includes a cryptlet private key and the cryptlet public key, and request that the cryptlet public key be sent to cryptlet fabric 460. Cryptlet fabric 460 may receive the public key and creates a cryptlet identity for the cryptlet, where the cryptlet identity consists of two components (1) the hash of the binary and (2) the cryptlet public key, because the cryptlet is uninstantiated. Cryptlet fabric 460 may register the cryptlet with the cryptlet identity in a cryptlet registry in cryptlet fabric 460, in which the cryptlet identity is stored as an entry in the cryptlet registry as part of the registration. In some examples, the cryptlet registry may act as a kind of catalog from which cryptlets can be selected.

In some examples, when a request for a particular cryptlet is made, and the cryptlet has yet to be instantiated, cryptlet fabric 460 intercepts the request. If the cryptlet will need to execute in a cryptlet, then regardless of whether or not enclave pooling is used, cryptlet fabric 460 may then identify an enclave to be used for executing the cryptlet. The cryptlet fabric 460 may send a cryptlet container to the enclave to be executed in the enclave, and the cryptlet container may fetch the cryptlet key pair for the cryptlet. In some examples, as previously discussed, this is accomplished via a secure channel between Key Vault 465 and the cryptlet container executing in the enclave. Regardless of whether the enclaves are pooled or not, cryptlet fabric 460 may also send the cryptlet binary to the enclave and the cryptlet may begin executing in the enclave.

The cryptlet fabric 460 may then generate the cryptlet binding for the cryptlet and the binding identification associated with the cryptlet binding for the cryptlet. The cryptlet executing in the enclave may output a payload that may be digitally signed by at least the private enclave key of the host enclave, and signed or encrypted by the cryptlet private key. In some examples, cryptlet fabric 460 receives the payload.

Cryptlet fabric 460 may also generate the cryptlet identity, as a combination of the binary hash, the cryptlet public key, and the binding Id. Cryptlet fabric 460 may then generate a hash digest of the cryptlet identity, and the contract proxy may cause the hash digest of the cryptlet identity to be provided/communicated to the blockchain ledger in blockchain network 450, where the hash digest may be recorded on the blockchain ledger representing the version of logic controlling the smart contract.

A check may be performed periodically to ensure that the cryptlet identity version is correct, that the signature is correct, and/or the like. In some examples, it is ensured that the cryptlet is not changed unless all parties agree to the change. In some examples, if all parties agree to a change in a smart contract, the cryptlet changes accordingly to an updated version. In some examples, the version of the cryptlet can be checked to ensure that the cryptlet instance was not changed in a manner that was not agreed to by all parties by verifying that the version stamp matches. In these examples, if the cryptlet instance is changed without the change being agreed to by all parties, the cryptlet instance will no longer function. Versioning and version verification are discussed in greater detail below.

In some examples, a cryptlet smart contract includes a contract cryptlet, the cryptlet binding of the contract cryptlet, and a smart contract instance stored on a ledger, where the smart contract ledger instance is also indicated in the cryptlet binding of the contract cryptlet. The smart contract ledger instance may be stored on a blockchain such as blockchain network 450, or, instead of being stored on a blockchain, may be stored on another datastore. In some examples, the smart contract ledger instance has a unique public address identified such as “ox9f37b1e1d82ebcoa163cd45f9fa5b384ea7313e8.” The smart contract ledger instance may include the state of the contract as well as other relevant information about the contract, as well as the digital signatures of the identities of the counterparties to the contract. The smart contract ledger instance may include various information from the lifetime of the contract, including information such as payments made, and information such as whether the contract is active, complete, awaiting counterparty signatures, or terminated.

In some examples, a smart contract ledger instance in generated in part from a schema. In some examples, a schema is a smart contract ledger template, which is used to generate a smart contract ledger instance in conjunction with basic information about the contract that needs to be filled in in order to generate the smart contract ledger instance from the template, which may include, for example, the initial seed properties for the smart contract. For instance, for an example smart contract that is a loan agreement, initial seed properties may include, for example, who the lender is, how much money is being borrowed, and/or the like. Subsequent terms of the contract may be determined through later contract negotiation, as discussed in greater detail below. The initial seed properties may be determined based on the template smart contract data structure for the smart contract stored in the relational distributed ledger.

In some examples, while the smart contract ledger instance includes the state of the smart contract, digital signatures, and other relevant data concerning the smart contract, it is not the complete smart contract because it does not include the smart contract logic. The smart contract logic may be performed by a contract cryptlet for which the cryptlet binding of the contract cryptlet includes a binding that is a mapping to the unique address of the corresponding smart contract ledger instance. In some examples, the cryptlet binding also includes mappings to a set of counterparties to the contract represented as public keys that may be tied to other identity systems. These counterparties can represent two or more people, companies, IoT devices, other smart contracts, and/or the like. The cryptlet binding may also include external sources. For example, the external sources may include one or more utility cryptlets that provide external data that a contract needs for its logic, such as an interest rate or a market price to calculate a payment or fee. A utility cryptlet may be used to present, for example, particular market data and to attest to the value of the presented market data. The cryptlet binding may include data from external sources to be received, as well as, for example, how frequently the external information is to be received.

A new smart contract may be initiated based on actions from one or more counterparty devices, e.g., counterparty device 416 and/or 417.

In some examples, smart contracts have several parts, including counterparties to the contract, logic (which typically includes contract cryptlets or token cryptlets), a schema, and defined external sources of information (which typically includes utility cryptlets). In some examples, the counterparties are the parties to the smart contract. Counterparties may be defined by user, device, or organization. In some examples, the schema defines the fields of the contract. The schema may include contract proxies per supported ledger. The defined external sources of information may include an interest rate, price of a commodity, other market data, and/or the like. In some examples, each part of the contract has a corresponding ID, such as the ID of each counterparty, the ID of each contract cryptlet used, the ID of each utility cryptlet used, and the ID of the schema. For instance, in some examples, each cryptlet is assigned a unique ID when the cryptlet is registered. The contract may have a dependency on another contract, where the ID of that contract is also part of this contract. In some examples, as part of the creation and deployment of the contract, as discussed above, the ID of each part of the contract is recorded in the relational distributed ledger.

In some examples, the relational distributed ledger is used to compose smart contracts. The relational disturbed ledger may include a registry (the Cryptlet Fabric Registry) that includes unique identifiers of various registered smart contract components, such as schemas, counterparties, contract logic, external sources, other contracts, contract proxies, networks, and/or the like. For example, networks may include blockchain or distributed ledger networks to which a smart contract ledger instance may be deployed. Parties can register new smart contract components to add them to the registry, so that each newly registered component has a unique identifier and all other relevant attributes. Part of the process of registering the smart contract component may include inputting the unique details about each component—such as user name, date of birth, binary hash, and/or the like.

A party or parties wanting to compose a contract may do so from the registered smart contract components, identifying the desired smart contract components by an ID, and also by a version where relevant. The desired components can be composed into a relational data structure that represents the smart contract template, and that is stored in the relational distributed ledger as part of the registry. The smart contract can be negotiated at this stage, with parties proposing changes to the smart contract until the smart contract is either eventually agreed to by all parties or rejected. In some examples, the relational distributed ledger is managed by cryptlet fabric 460. Counterparties may interact with cryptlet fabric 460 to compose the relational data structure.

Some smart contract components, as well as smart contracts themselves, may be represented by both an ID and a version. For example, logic in a contract cryptlet may be updated, resulting in a new version of the contract cryptlet, while still maintaining the same identity. Accordingly, in some examples, contract cryptlets identified in the registry of the relational distributed ledger are identified by both the ID of the contract cryptlet and the version of the contract cryptlet.

Each smart contract component in the registry of the relational distributed ledger may have various attributes, which may vary depending on the type of smart contract component. In some examples, one attribute may indicate the visibility of the smart contract component. For instance, a smart contract component may be visible to the public, visible to one particular counterparty, or a visible to a particular set of counterparties. In some examples, registered counterparties can view all smart contract components in the relational distributed database that don't have a property that exclude the counterparty from viewing it, and the visible smart contract components are discoverable by the counterparties, which allows counterparties to view these smart contract components to compose and/or participate in smart contracts. Proposed/partial smart contracts may also be visible and discoverable, perhaps made available for discovery by a counterparty that would like to receive bids on the proposed smart contract.

In some examples, an attribute of a smart contract component may include a means of accessing the smart contract component, such as an address of the smart component, address of an entity that can obtain the smart contract component when given the ID and version of the smart contract component, and/or the like. Other attributes for some registered smart contract components may include, for example, size, memory, a snapshot of how the component looks when initiated in memory, and/or the like. Attributes may also include unique details about the component, depending on the type of component, such as user name, date of birth, binary hash, and/or the like. The attributes may also include attributes discussed above with regard to the Cryptlet Fabric Registry. In some examples, the relational distributed ledger may also include the signature of each piece of code, so that, along with the identity and the version of the piece of code, the piece of code can be fetched.

Once counterparties agree to a smart contract so composed, the counterparties may send a request to cryptlet fabric 460 to create the smart contract template based on the template smart contract data structure. In response to the request, cryptlet fabric 460 may enable the counterparties to each digitally sign the template smart contract data structure. In some examples, the smart contract is finalized once all parties digitally sign the smart contract. That is, in some examples, the smart contract itself is finalized, although execution of the contract has not yet begun. As discussed in greater detail below, in some examples, although the smart contract is finalized, it is possible for a new version of the smart the contract to be created, as discussed in greater detail below. In some examples, the proposed smart contract is not finalized yet and is not yet signed by the counterparties, but rather a proposed smart contract is initialized, to be finalized at a later stage.

In some examples, once each of the counterparties has digitally signed the template smart contract data structure, cryptlet fabric 460 creates a corresponding smart contract template from the template smart contract data structure, and activates the smart contract template. Once activated, the smart contract template listens for a contract constructor message and/or for other new messages. Cryptlet fabric 460 then provides a contract cryptlet, e.g., by instantiating the contract cryptlet, in order to begin the process of creating the smart contract. The contract cryptlet to be used to begin the process of creating the smart contract may be indicated as one of the smart contract components in the template smart contract data structure.

In some examples, the contract cryptlet to be instantiated may require an enclave. If so, the following may occur in some examples. Cryptlet fabric 460 identifies an enclave to be used for executing the contract cryptlet. Cryptlet fabric 460 sends a cryptlet container to the enclave to be executed in the enclave, and the cryptlet container may fetch the cryptlet key pair for the cryptlet. This may be accomplished via a secure channel between Key Vault 465 and the cryptlet container executing in the enclave. Cryptlet fabric 460 may also send the cryptlet binary for the contract cryptlet to the enclave and the contract cryptlet may begin executing in the enclave.

In other examples, the contract cryptlet does not need an enclave, or may need an enclave at a later time but not for the initial execution of the contract cryptlet. For example, the contract cryptlet may need to execute in an enclave during certain portions of time and not others, the portions of time for which the cryptlet needs to execute in an enclave might not include the initial execution of the contract cryptlet, for instance. In this case, cryptlet fabric 460 causes the contract cryptlet to begin execution. Either way, at this point, in some examples, the contract cryptlet begins execution, either in an enclave or not in an enclave.

After the contract cryptlet begins execution, the contract cryptlet may make a request for information, such as a request for the initial seed properties of the contract, or the contract cryptlet may have already received the information. Cryptlet fabric 460 may then respond to the request. In some examples, either way, the contract cryptlet receives the information, including the initial seed information for starting the contract. In some examples, the contract cryptlet then generates a contract constructor message.

Cryptlet fabric 460 may then fetch the schema associated with requested contract. In some examples, cryptlet fabric 460 may already have a stored copy of the schema in cryptlet fabric 460; in other examples, cryptlet fabric 460 requests and receives a copy of the schema from a source external to cryptlet fabric 460.

In some examples, after the schema has been fetched, the activated smart contract template causes an instance of the smart contract to be deployed on a transactional ledger that will be used to store the transaction, state, and the like associated with the smart contract while the smart contract executes. In some examples, the smart contract is deployed on a transactional ledger on a specified network, which may be a public network, consortium network, or the like. In some examples, the network to which the smart contract is deployed is one of the registered smart contract components selected when composing the template smart contract data structure.

In some examples, the setup is multi-homed, and there maybe multiple networks, including multiple consortium networks, that are options for the smart contract to be deployed. In some examples, the transactional ledger also stores the address of the smart contract relational data structure. In some examples, the transactional ledger is a ledger on blockchain network 450. In other examples, the transaction ledger is a ledger in a datastore that is not part of a blockchain.

In some examples, the relational distributed ledger that stores the template smart contract data structure is used for the identity, versioning, and relationships of the smart contract, whereas the transactional ledger is used for transactions associated with the smart contract while the smart contract executes. After causing the smart contract ledger instance to be deployed, cryptlet fabric 460 may receive the unique address of the smart contract ledger, where the address acts as the unique identification of the smart contract ledger instance. Cryptlet fabric 460 may then create a ContractBinding with a unique identifier (GUID/UUID) and version hash.

In some examples, the cryptlet binding includes bindings for the contract cryptlet. In some examples, each of these bindings is a mapping between the contract cryptlet and another cryptlet, a smart contract, or an identification of a counterparty to the smart contract. The bindings may be used to route messages between the cryptlet and the other cryptlets or smart contracts to which the cryptlet is mapped by the binding. The cryptlet binding may represent the properties and/or rules of the cryptlet. For instance, in an example of a cryptlet that is an interest rate swap, the cryptlet binding may include the identities (public key) of the counterparties to the interest rate swap, where the cryptlet gets interest rate pricing, and how often the cryptlet gets interest rate pricing.

The cryptlet binding may include a binding that is a mapping between the contract cryptlet and the unique address of the smart contract ledger instance, which serves as the unique identification of the smart contract ledger instance. The cryptlet binding may also include a binding for each counterparty that is represented as a public key. The cryptlet binding may include mappings to external sources of data, such as a mapping to a utility cryptlet that provides and attests to market data needed by the logic of the smart contract cryptlet.

In some examples, the smart contract was finalized prior to this stage, with the counterparties all digitally signing prior to this stage. In some examples, the smart contract is not complete at this time, but is rather either proposed or partial. In these examples, the smart contract is finalized at this time based on negotiation of the counterparties and using the relational distributed ledger and the smart contract components stored in the registry. In these examples, once the smart contract is finalized, the counterparties digitally sign.

In some examples, after the contract binding is complete and the counterparties have digitally signed, the smart contract ledger instance is stamped with a version stamp recorded in the transaction ledger. In some examples, once the cryptlet binding is complete and the smart contract ledger instance has been stamped with a version stamp recorded in the transaction ledger, the contract cryptlet begins to run the actual contract logic. The contract proxy may communicate to the smart contract ledger instance to update the smart contract ledger instance when appropriate, such as when there is a state change, or the like. In some examples, the contract proxy updates the smart contract ledger instance while causing the proof onions of each transaction to be stored by proofing service 467.

In some examples, after a smart contract is complete, the contract cryptlet instance no longer exists, but the smart contract ledger instance still exists, and it is possible afterwards for an authorized party to review the ledger to obtain historical information about the contract. In some examples, it is also possible to revalidate transactions, or the entire history of a smart contract, with proofing service 467. In some examples, the contract cryptlet does not persistently store its state or any other aspects of the contract; rather, the contract cryptlet uses the smart contract ledger instance to store the state of the contract cryptlet and other smart contract data—other than the proofing structures, which are instead stored by proofing service 467.

As a non-limiting example, an overview of a process that employs use of a Cryptlet Smart Contract may include:

1. Counterparties use the cryptlet fabric to compose a template smart contract data structure on a relational distributed ledger from registered smart contract components in the relational distributed ledger, where the registered smart contract components may include, for example, counterparties, logic, a schema, external sources, other contracts, proxies, networks, and/or the like. Upon agreement of all counterparties to the proposed smart contract, the counterparties digitally sign the template smart contract data structure, and then a request for the new contract is made to the cryptlet fabric. In some examples, the smart contract is only proposed at this stage and is not yet signed by the counterparties. The cryptlet fabric then activates a smart contract template that waits for a contract construct message and/or other new messages.

2. In response to the request for the new contract being made to the cryptlet fabric, which in some cases is made is to a contract cryptlet that is executing in waiting or newly instantiated by the fabric to handle the request to begin the contract creation process.

3. The contract cryptlet takes the new contract request, which include initial seed information required for starting the contract which can be as little or as much information needed for that contract, e.g., contract name, description, first counterparty (e.g., lender), etc.) The contract cryptlet may validate this request and generate a contract constructor message that it sends to the cryptlet fabric. This message may be signed with at least the cryptlet and its enclave signatures. This message may also be signed with the first counterparty's signature. This message may also include the public address(es) in the message for the contract cryptlet and/or any counterparty(-ies) in the constructor message.

4. The activated smart contract template may validate this request, determine the destination blockchain type, format a blockchain specific transaction, and route this message to the appropriate blockchain. In this example, the transaction flows from the cryptlet fabric, perhaps running in the public or a private cloud to a blockchain node that can be running anywhere.

5. The blockchain node may validate this message, which in some cases may first be validated by the CryptoDelegate that validates the outer layers of the proof onion, e.g., to ensure this transaction message originates from valid and secure source(s), via the enclave and cryptlet signatures. The message may then be sent to the blockchain node for execution. In some cases, a CryptoDelegate is not available and only the blockchain specific signature is checked before sending the message to the node for execution.

6. The blockchain node upon receiving this request for a new contract via a constructor message may then execute the code creating the smart contract instance using the defined schema in the constructor and embedded the public address(es) of the owning cryptlet contract and any counterparty(-ies) in the appropriate places within the schema, e.g., to ensure only the contract cryptlet can update this instance of the contract, and establishes any counterparty(-ies) in their roles within this contract. This smart contract is given a unique identifier, usually a public key, that serves as an address where future messages for interaction can be sent on that blockchain. This address may be returned from the constructor message and passed from the node back to the cryptlet fabric.

7. The cryptlet fabric may receive this address and create a base cryptlet contract binding. In some examples, the binding includes references to the contract cryptlet, the smart contract instance address and any counterparty(-ies) provided in the constructor message.

8. The cryptlet fabric may then provide this binding to the contract cryptlet for it to become active with a new composite identifier, e.g., its binary hash, public address, and the binding identifier. This contract cryptlet may now be bound to service only the binding that it is associated with, and will only be allowed to work with secrets, private keys, for those entities listed in its binding.

9. In some cases, this binding ID is then passed back to the sender of the original new contract request, for example a User Application or perhaps another system. Additional messages sent to the cryptlet fabric referencing this binding ID should be routed to the Contract Cryptlet bound with that ID. In some cases, these additional messages include additional contract details being or to be added, like loan term, amount borrowed, and counterparty agreement (e.g., to the terms of the contract). Each of these messages may be handled by the contract cryptlet, validated, signed, and delivered as state to the underlying smart contract address. In some examples, all of the contract details are already finalized before the request for a new contract was sent, and the smart contract is not further modified except possibly for version changes. In some examples, the contract details are not finalized until this phase, and the counterparties do not sign the digital contract until this phase, after the counterparties agree upon the terms of the smart contract.

10. In some cases, external data is required for a contract to function, for example, a variable interest rate that can change from month to month. In these cases, a cryptlet fabric may add a utility cryptlet to the contract binding. In some examples, this external data provider portion of the binding includes the identification of the utility cryptlet providing this data, the requirements for receiving this external data like an event: time based, threshold or ad hoc/on demand from the contract cryptlet. In some cases, these external data update rules are recorded in the contract and agreed to by all the counterparties as data regarding the source and circumstances for updates to be accepted. For example, a rule may define that interest rates are to be determined on the 5th day of every month a 4:00 PM EST using the 5 Year Treasury rate+.10 basis points from source with a name “interest rate source” and a with a particular public key. Once agreed this external data source may be added to the cryptlet binding of the contract cryptlet, and a binding for the utility cryptlet may be created and sent to the utility cryptlet. The utility cryptlet may use its binding rules to trigger data updates to be sent to the contract cryptlet. Any data updates may be signed by the utility cryptlet and its host enclave, e.g., for validation. External data updates provided by utility cryptlets to contract cryptlets may be persisted to the smart contract address with the utility cryptlet signatures along with calculation results from the contract cryptlet with signatures, e.g., to provide proofs and attestations of data validity. In some examples, the proof onions are persisted to a proofing service instead of being persisted to the smart contract address, for re-attestation at a later time upon request.

11. A version stamp is created for this initial version of the contract, and the smart contract ledger instance is stamped with the version stamp. The version stamp is discussed in greater detail below.

12. Once a Cryptlet Binding has a smart contract ledger address, the counterparty signatures, and optional external data source(s) defined by the Cryptlet Binding, and the version stamp has been recorded in the ledger, the Cryptlet Binding becomes fully operational and can usually execute independently for the full term of the contract, e.g., interacting via messages relevant to its binding. Such messages may be associated with payments, receipts, notifications, etc.

Cryptlets may perform advanced, proprietary, private execution with secrets kept from counterparties, such as private keys or different variable values for counterparties that should not be shared, e.g., terms and prices. In this case, more than one instance of a cryptlet may be used in order to keep secrets (e.g., keys, contract terms) in separate secure address spaces, to provide isolation, and for privacy encryption schemes like ring or threshold encryption schemes for storing shared secrets on the blockchain. Among other things, each counterparty may have its own private user key. In some examples, one of more of the counterparties may have, as secret, negotiating terms of their portion of the smart contract, but the total smart contract can still be determined in aggregate while keeping the negotiating terms of each counterparty secret.

In some examples, cryptlets each running the same logic in a separate enclave that are hosting secrets for a single counterparty in a multi-counterparty smart contract run in a pair for two counterparties or a ring with more than two counterparties. In some examples, the cryptlets running in a pair or a ring perform the same execution logic with different cryptographic keys for signing and/or secret parameters not shared with others.

Many different types of smart contract execution logic can be executed in various examples. Some example may include a financial derivative that is active during market hours, which obtains market data, calculates distributions, and moves balances dynamically.

In some examples, cryptlets in one of these configurations participate in simple consensus processes with a witness providing validation, such as Paxos, a simple 100% match between pairs, and/or the like. In some examples, the witness also acts as a notary. As discussed in greater detail below, in some examples, the witness executes in a separate enclave.

A contract cryptlet typically involves multiple counterparties. In some examples, cryptlet execution paths are used that follow a single counterparty workflow where one counterparty executes a step and signs, releases, and the next counterparty picks up the next step and can use one instance of a cryptlet at a time with each instance fetching the counterparty secrets during that step. This may prevent counterparty secrets from being present in the same enclave.

In some examples, cryptlets are run as shared code in multiple enclaves with each enclave hosting a single counterparty's secrets and signing the counterparty's cryptlet instances output with the counterparty's private key and submitting it to the cryptlet pair/ring witness for validation. In various examples, secrets are not limited to keys for signing or encryption; some of the secrets can be variables as well.

A ring or pair topology may be used in which counterparties execute logic at the same time and synchronously agree on the collective output before persisting the collective output to the underlying database/blockchain. In some examples, a pair or ring will instantiate a cryptlet for each counterparty to synchronously run the shared logic of the cryptlet in the counterparty's own enclave with only that counterparty's secrets. In some examples, the logic is then run, and the output is signed/encrypted/computed with the counterparty's secrets and provided to the witness. In some examples, after the outputs are provided by the enclaves for the counterparties, the counterparty results are validated, as described in greater detail below.

As previously discussed, in a pair or ring topology, enclave-to-enclave secure tunnels may be used to communicate securely between enclaves in the ring or pair.

One example of a process for use with a pair or ring topology of enclaves may proceed as follows. In some examples, prior to the instantiation of any particular cryptlets, cryptlets and cryptlet bindings may be generated for later use in particular instantiations. In some examples, for cryptlets that are used in a pair or ring, the corresponding cryptlet binding for the cryptlet will be configured accordingly to that the cryptlet will properly operates as part of the pair or ring.

In some examples, when a request for a particular cryptlet is made, and the cryptlet has yet to be instantiated, cryptlet fabric 460 intercepts the request. Cryptlet fabric 460 may then fetch a corresponding cryptlet binding for the cryptlet. In some examples, if the cryptlet is to be run in a pair or ring topology, then a cryptlet binding that is configured accordingly is fetched. Cryptlet fabric 460 may then determine the requirements and counterparties based on the cryptlet binding. In some examples, cryptlet fabric 460 then identifies and fetches the enclaves-one for each counterparty, and also one for the witness if the cryptlet binding indicates that a witness it to be used. In some examples, cryptlet fabric 460 then sends/injects a cryptlet container to each of the fetched enclaves, and each enclave executes the cryptlet container that was sent to the enclave.

In some examples, the cryptlet containers cause secure tunnels between each enclave and Key Vault 465, and secure tunnels between the enclaves. The cryptlet containers may each securely receive keys and other secrets from Key Vault 465. By providing properly configured cryptlet containers to the enclaves, cryptlet fabric 460 may cause secrets associated with each counterparty to be securely provided to each corresponding enclave.

In some examples, cryptlet fabric 460 provides to each of the enclaves the cryptlet binding. In some examples, cryptlet fabric 460 may send cryptlet binaries to each of the cryptlets. In some examples, each of the cryptlets then executes in the enclave. In some examples, the cryptlet running for each enclave are identical to each other and include identical execution logic, with the difference being only in the secrets of each enclave. In some examples, execution of cryptlets occurs in the manner described above. In some examples, the execution logic is the same for the enclave of each counterparty—the only difference is in secrets, which may include keys. In some examples, the enclave for each counterparty then should provide the same payload as the enclave for each other counterparty, except that, for example, signatures may be different. In some examples, after the enclave for each party generates a payload, the counterparty results are validated. In some examples, the validity of the payloads from each party are validated such that some computed fields need to match or agree, but others do not, such as the sum of some inputs, but the order of the inputs may differ. In some examples, the signatures are also different.

In some examples, the witness is also running in an enclave and validates the counterparty results and determines if consensus is achieved, and if consensus is achieved, the witness sends the signed output to the Cryptlet Fabric 460 for delivery to the data tier. In some examples, a Cryptlet Pair witness simply requires output validation equality and issues re-compute commands to cryptlet payloads that don't validate. In some examples, the witness determines whether the payload of each cryptlet in the ring or pair is the same as each of the other payloads. In some examples, a Cryptlet Ring can use a consensus protocol such as Paxos or the like to achieve consensus. After validation and/or consensus, cryptlet fabric 460 may provide the collective output to the data tier. In some examples, the collective output is then persisted on blockchain network 450.

In some examples, the ring or pair topology allows secure multi-party computing to be performed for blockchains or other shared applications while allowing counterparties to have secrets isolated from each other. In some examples, the counterparties each execute logic at the same time, and synchronously agree on the collective output in the manner described before persisting the collective output to the blockchain.

In some examples, for a cryptlet that is to be used in a ring or a pair topology, the cryptlet binding for the cryptlet is configured accordingly. In some examples, the cryptlet binding for the cryptlet to be used in a ring or pair topology indicates the requirements and the counterparties.

In some examples, ring encryption may be used. In some examples in which ring encryption is used, the private keys of each of the counterparties may be loaded, and a ring signature generated. In some examples, instead of using a witness, ring encryption may be used and the payloads can all be broadcast and processed at substantially the same time.

It may be desirable to change some aspects of the smart contract for any number of various reasons. For instance, one of the counterparties may be changed because the contract is assigned to another party. As another example, a bug may be discovered in a cryptlet, and it may be desirable to use a different cryptlet, for example a repaired version of the same cryptlet, to provide the intended functionality. In some examples, the contract cannot just be changed, or else the contract would then not be recognized as valid.

Instead creating a new contract with a new unique identifier, a new version of the smart contract may be provided that keeps the same unique identifier or address of the smart contract while having a different version identifier. In some examples, the smart contract itself may include versioning rules, such as rules on how a versioning change may occur, which counterparties must agree to a versioning change, or the like. For example, the versioning rules may allow that a counterparty effectively replace itself with another counterparty that the contract has been assigned to in place of that counterparty, but that all other versioning changes requires agreement of all of the counterparties. In some examples, a new version typically requires that all counterparties agree to a new version unless the versioning rules specifically state otherwise. In some cases, the versioning rules may only require a certain subset of the counterparties to agree to a versioning change.

In some examples, a new version of a contract is a not a new contract—it is simply a new version of the contract. In some examples, the binding ID is the same across all versions of a contract. However, in some examples, each separate version of a contract has its own binding version stamp. In some examples, each version of a contract, including the original version of the contract, is stamped by Cryptlet Fabric 460 with a unique binding version stamp. Stamping each version of the contract, including the original version of the contract, allows a complete audit trail of version changes.

Cryptlet fabric 460 may assign each version of a smart contract with unique version ID, such as a random globally unique identifier (GUID). In some examples, when a version of a smart contract is created, including the original version, a version stamp is also created for the version, and the version is stamped on the ledger with the version stamp by Cryptlet Fabric 460. In some examples, the version stamp may include hash of the version ID. In some examples, the version stamp may include, for each counterparty to the version, a hash of the ID of the counterparty. In some examples, the version stamp may include a hash of the binary file of the logic of the version. In some examples, the version stamp may include, for each utility cryptlet used as an external source by the version, a hash of the ID of the utility cryptlet. In some examples, the version stamp may include a hash of the signature of the publisher. In some examples, the version stamp may include a hash of the ID of the schema used by the version. In some examples, the version stamp may include the ID of each contract on which this contract is dependent, if any. Using a composite of hashes of various components of the version may provide for a strong version stamp.

In some examples, each transaction made by a smart contract includes the version stamp as part of the transaction. In some examples, for each transaction, the version stamp is checked to determine whether the version stamp matches. In some examples, a function modifier exists at the front of every method that is employed on a smart contract, and the function modifier checks to determine whether the version stamp matches before performing the method. The check may include performing a hash on each relevant component of the version to determine whether the version stamp matches the components as hashed.

In some examples, if the version stamp does not match, the transaction does not proceed, and appropriate action is taken, including, for instance, in some examples, informing all of the counterparties, and kicking off a support ticket. In some examples, a determination may be made as to which component was changed, and actions may be taken accordingly. In some examples, where appropriate, a break fix may be initiated by Cryptlet Fabric 460. For example, if the cryptlet binary has changed, Cryptlet Fabric 460 may determine where the changed cryptlet binary was obtained, how it was changed, and may attempt to get the correct binary in the smart contract and to execute the contract with the correct binary. In some examples, if the version stamp does not match and a fix is not possible, then the smart contract version will cease to function. In some examples, if the version stamp does not match because one of the counterparties violated the terms, then a breach of contract has occurred, and a separate process for the breach of contract may be initiated by Cryptlet Fabric 460 accordingly.

For instance, in some examples, the version stamp is used to validate each incoming transaction that is to be written onto the ledger. In some examples, methods with an incorrect hash are rejected and are not written to the ledger.

One of the counterparties to the contract may propose a new version of the contract. In some examples, Cryptlet Fabric 460 kicks off a workflow in response to the proposal. In some examples, versioning rules may be present in the contract, or versioning rules may not be present. In some examples, if no versioning rules are present, then the proposal for a new version must be unanimously agreed to by all of the counterparties, or else the proposal will be rejected. In some examples, the versioning rules may require that a party can effectively replace itself with another counterparty that the counterparty has assigned the contract to, but that all other versioning changes require agreement of all of the counterparties. In some examples, a new version typically requires that all counterparties agree to a new version unless the versioning rules specifically state otherwise. In some cases, the versioning rules may only require a certain subset of the counterparties to agree to a versioning change. In some examples, the proposal is accepted and the new version created by Cryptlet Fabric 460 only upon receiving the signature of each counterparty of the contract for which agreement of that party is required according to the voting requirements specified in the versioning rules, or the signatures of all counterparties to the contract if the versioning rules do not specify otherwise. In some examples, if one of the counterparties no longer exists and a new counterparty has been assigned the contract in lieu of the party that no longer exists, and the proposal is to add the newly assigned counterparty, the signature of the counterparty that no longer exists is not required. In this case, in some examples, the other counterparties must agree that the counterparty no longer exists in order for the proposal to be accepted, unless the versioning rules specify otherwise.

If a new version is proposed, in some examples, Cryptlet Fabric 460 causes the current version to pause operation until the either the proposal is rejected, in which case the current version resumes operation, or until the proposal is accepted and the new version begins execution, at which point the paused version ceases operation entirely. In some examples, the current version continues executing until and unless the proposal is accepted and the new version begins execution, in which case the old version ceases operation. Two versions of a contract may both be operating simultaneously for a brief time in some examples.

In some examples, when a new version of an existing smart contract is created by Cryptlet Fabric 460, some components, including the binding, remain the same, with at least one different part as agreed on by the proposal. Cryptlet Fabric 460 may create and deploy the new version in the same manner as the original version of the contract, except that some components are simply re-used from the earlier version of the contract, and re-recorded on the ledger where the new version is being recorded. In some examples, the new version receives a new version ID, and a new version stamp is created for the version, and stamped on the ledger where the new version is being recorded by Cryptlet Fabric 460.

In some examples, the versioning change may be bedded into the schema itself. In this way, in some examples, a new proxy is configured and built in to the existing contract schema. In other examples, a new version of the contract is instead recorded on a separate system. In some examples, the new version of the contract has a reference to the earlier version of the contract, and the earlier version of the contract has a reference to the new version of the contract. The reference may be, for example, a recorded address of the location of the version.

As previously discussed, in the template smart contract data structure on the relational distributed ledger, the contract may reference another contract. One or more contracts may result from other contracts. For example, a party may wish credit from a bank in order to fulfill an order, may wish to insure goods associated with the order, and/or the like, and may form additional contracts related to the initial contract accordingly.

There may be several interlinked contracts. For instance, in one example, there may be a contract by a manufacturer to provide 1,000 widgets with a 90-day delivery. A bank may then have a contract with the manufacturer for financing the order.

Further, when the manufacturer that contracted to provide the 1,000 widgets is ready to ship the widgets, the manufacturer may initiate a specialty insurance contract with an insurer for insurance on the shipment. The party providing the insurance may initiate an IoT contract to track the temperature of the shipment. For example, the initial contract may call for a delivery in which the temperature does not exceed a particular temperature limit. An IoT vendor party may have a contract to provide temperature monitoring to track the temperature of the shipment and feed correct readings into the contract. ESC platform 339 may initialize a contract based on the bid and offer for the temperature monitoring.

In some examples, all the contracts relating to an initial contract together form an enterprise smart contract (ESC). Each contract of the ESC is registered to the same relational distributed database. Various events may trigger interrelated clauses of the ESC. For example, if the temperature of the shipment is determined to exceed the temperature limit, the smart contract logic for the temperature monitoring contract may trigger a violation of the corresponding contract, which may in turn trigger an insurance claim being filed, which in turn may trigger a remediation process to be initialized. Similarly, if the goods are shipped late, consequences may be triggered by the logic performed by the smart contract logic. This is one example of one of many ways in which contracts in an ESC can “deep-link” to each other to create a collection of contracts that make up the entire ESC structure that allows for cascading events. In some examples, the setup is multi-homed, so that the various contracts that comprise an ESC may be on separate networks, including, for example, on separate private consortium network, all while still capable of interacting with the relational distributed ledger.

Counterparties may use the relational data structure for the smart contract to view relational aspects of the smart contract, including other smart contracts related directly or via a chain of two or more contract relationships to the present smart contract, which may be used to obtain a real-time view of contractual risk for related smart contracts. This may be used, among other things, to make a determination as to whether countermeasures against particular risks should be taken, and may assist in creating a contract that may counteract the risk.

The ability to view contracts related to other contracts may also be used for a variety of other purposes, including preventing double spending which could otherwise prevent the securitization. In some examples, if these factors can be securitized, then they can be sold into markets which may support other derivative contracts like options or swaps. In some examples, these securities could then be used to purchase and used to collateralize a loan to purchase resources from a supplier. In some examples, each contract has a chain of contracts on all sides with counterparties, which forms a hierarchical tree of contracts from that contract's vantage point. This may occur across all industries, where finance (banking, insurance and capital markets) and legal flow grease contract execution with additional contracts.

Additionally, the fact that there is one common place where the entire ESC is stored and can be validated may allow transactions to be settled quickly that might otherwise take several days because different transactions occur on separate networks, or that would otherwise need to be checked among separate ledgers.

Accordingly, the relational distributed ledger may act as a relational, privacy-preserving, partitionable data structure that can form a relational hierarchical network.

As discussed above, during the execution of a smart contract, for each transaction, the proof onion is verified by the CryptoDelegate. After verifying the transaction, the transaction is stored in the blockchain network/distributed transactional ledger by the contract proxy corresponding to the blockchain network/distributed transactional ledger. At a subsequent time, a query can be made to proofing service 467 to validate a transaction, or multiple transactions, or for every blockchain transaction performed for the smart contract.

In some examples, the proof onion is stored for every transaction is stored by proofing service 467. In some examples, the proof onion is stored for every transaction except read transactions.

In some examples, for every transaction associated with a smart contract, the corresponding contract proxy receives the transaction after the transaction has been verified by the CryptoDelegate. In some examples, for transactions with proof onions that are to be stored (e.g., all transactions except read transactions), the contract proxy separates the proof onion from the rest of the transaction. In some examples, the contract proxy then sends the proof onion to proofing service 467. In some examples, proofing service 467, in response to the received proof onion, calculates a hash of the proof onion and the binding ID of the contract associated with the contract. In some examples, the hash of the proof onion and the binding ID is called the “transaction hash.” In some examples, after proofing service 467 calculates the transaction hash, proofing service 467 stores the proof onion, indexed based on the transaction hash, and returns the transaction hash to the cryptlet proxy.

In some examples, when the contract proxy receives the transaction hash, the contract proxy appends the transaction hash to the transaction, and then writes the transaction, along with the appended transaction hash, to the ledger. In some examples, the blockchain sends back a receipt to the contract proxy in response. In some examples, the contract proxy then sends the receipt to proof service 467. In some examples, proof service 467 then records the receipt, and sends a confirmation back to the contract proxy that proof service 467 received the receipt.

At a subsequent time, a proof report may be requested, for example for a single transaction, or for all transactions associated with a particular smart contract. In some examples, the request for the proof report includes the binding ID of the contract. If the request is a request for a proof report for a particular transaction, the request may include the transaction hash. In some examples, the transaction hash can be obtained for the request because the transaction hash is appended to the transaction on the blockchain.

In response to the request, in some examples, proofing service 467 obtains the corresponding proof onion, or proof onions in the case of verifying multiple transactions. In some examples, the binding that includes the proof onion is retrieved. In some examples, the onion proof is indexed based on the transaction hash, so that the transaction hash is used to locate the proof onion. In some examples, proofing service 467 then uses the identifier and version of each public key needed for validation of the proof(s) to request the corresponding public keys from the Cryptlet Fabric Registry. In some examples, proofing service 467 then receives the corresponding public keys from the Cryptlet Fabric Registry, and uses the public keys to revalidate the proof onion(s). In some examples, it is mathematically sufficient to validate just the outer layer of the proof onion, because verifying the outer layer of the proof onion is mathematical proof of the validity of every layer of the proof onion. However, in some examples, upon request, proof service 467 may validate each layer of the proof onion.

In some examples, proofing service 467 then sends a proof report that includes the result of the validation(s) in response to the request for the proof report. In some examples, the proof report is a customer-friendly report that revalidates the onion against the requested transaction; the proof report does not disclose any of the actual transaction data. The proof report may also include the transaction receipts.

Examples of the disclosure may make use of the proofing service to ensure that no data was tampered with, without disclosing any private data.

Illustrative Processes

For clarity, the processes described herein are described in terms of operations performed in particular sequences by particular devices or components of a system. However, it is noted that other processes are not limited to the stated sequences, devices, or components. For example, certain acts may be performed in different sequences, in parallel, omitted, or may be supplemented by additional acts or features, whether or not such sequences, parallelisms, acts, or features are described herein. Likewise, any of the technology described in this disclosure may be incorporated into the described processes or other processes, whether or not that technology is specifically described in conjunction with a process. The disclosed processes may also be performed on or by other devices, components, or systems, whether or not such devices, components, or systems are described herein. These processes may also be embodied in a variety of ways. For example, they may be embodied on an article of manufacture, e.g., as processor-readable instructions stored in a processor-readable storage medium or be performed as a computer-implemented process. As an alternate example, these processes may be encoded as processor-executable instructions and transmitted via a communications medium.

FIGS. 5A-5B illustrate an example dataflow for a process (580). In some examples, process 580 is performed by a proofing service, e.g., proofing service 467 of FIG. 4.

In the illustrated example, step 581 occurs first. At step 581, in some examples, proof onions for transactions for smart contracts are stored. In some examples, details of the transactions are stored on blockchains separate from the proof onions. In some examples, the proof onions are proof structures for the transactions. In some examples, the proof onions include a plurality of proofs. In some examples, the plurality of proofs includes at least one enclave signature from a first enclave. In some examples, the first enclave is a secure execution environment.

As shown, step 582 occurs next in some examples. At step 582, in some examples, a proof request that is associated with at least a first transaction of the transactions is received. As shown, step 583 occurs next in some examples. At step 583, in some examples, a first proof onion of the proof onions that corresponds to the first transaction is retrieved. As shown, step 584 occurs next in some examples. At step 584, in some examples, a plurality of public keys associated with the first proof onion is obtained.

As shown, step 585 occurs next in some examples. At step 585, in some examples, the plurality of public keys is used to validate the first proof onion. As shown, step 586 occurs next in some examples. At step 586, in some examples, in response to the validation of the first proof onion, the proof request is responded to with at least an indication of the validity of the first transaction.

The process may then proceed to the return block, where other processing is resumed.

CONCLUSION

While the above Detailed Description describes certain examples of the technology, and describes the best mode contemplated, no matter how detailed the above appears in text, the technology can be practiced in many ways. Details may vary in implementation, while still being encompassed by the technology described herein. As noted above, particular terminology used when describing certain features or aspects of the technology should not be taken to imply that the terminology is being redefined herein to be restricted to any specific characteristics, features, or aspects with which that terminology is associated. In general, the terms used in the following claims should not be construed to limit the technology to the specific examples disclosed herein, unless the Detailed Description explicitly defines such terms. Accordingly, the actual scope of the technology encompasses not only the disclosed examples, but also all equivalent ways of practicing or implementing the technology. 

We claim:
 1. An apparatus, comprising: a device including at least one memory adapted to store run-time data for the device, and at least one processor that is adapted to execute processor-executable code that, in response to execution, enables the device to perform actions, including: storing proof onions for transactions for smart contracts, wherein details of the transactions are stored on blockchains separate from the proof onions, wherein the proof onions are proof structures for the transactions, wherein the proof onions include a plurality of signatures, wherein the plurality of signatures includes at least one enclave signature from a first enclave, and wherein the first enclave is a secure execution environment; receiving a proof request that is associated with at least a first transaction of the transactions; retrieving a first proof onion of the proof onions that corresponds to the first transaction; obtaining a plurality of public keys associated with the first proof onion; using the plurality of public keys to validate the first proof onion; and in response to the validation of the first proof onion, responding to the proof request with at least an indication of the validity of the first transaction.
 2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein obtaining the plurality of public keys includes requesting the plurality of public keys from a registry based on an identifier and a version of each public key of the plurality of public keys.
 3. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the proof request includes at least a binding identifier.
 4. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the proof request includes a transaction hash, wherein retrieving the first proof onion includes locating the first proof onion based on the transaction hash, and wherein the transaction hash is a hash of at least the first proof onion.
 5. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the first proof onion includes at least three digital signatures.
 6. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the first proof onion further includes a blockchain-specific signature.
 7. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the first proof onion further includes a digital signature of a cryptlet in which code for the transaction was executed.
 8. The apparatus of claim 1, the actions further including: receiving a second proof onion from a contract proxy; calculating a hash based at least in part on the second proof onion; storing the second proof onion; indexing the second proof onion based on the hash; and communicating the hash to the contract proxy.
 9. An apparatus, comprising: a device including at least one memory adapted to store run-time data for the device, and at least one processor that is adapted to execute processor-executable code that, in response to execution, enables the device to perform actions, including: receiving a transaction encapsulated by a proof onion, wherein the proof onion is a proof structure for the transaction, wherein the proof onion includes a plurality of signatures, wherein the plurality of signatures includes at least one enclave signature from a first enclave, and wherein the first enclave is a secure execution environment; sending the proof onion to a proofing service; receiving, from the proofing service, a transaction hash that is a hash of at least the proof onion; appending the transaction hash to the transaction; and causing the transaction, including the appended transaction hash, to be recorded on a ledger that is separate from the proofing service.
 10. The apparatus of claim 9, the actions further including: receiving a receipt from the ledger; sending the receipt to the proofing service; and receiving a confirmation of the receipt from the proofing service.
 11. The apparatus of claim 9, wherein the first proof onion includes at least three digital signatures.
 12. The apparatus of claim 9, wherein the first proof onion further includes a blockchain-specific signature.
 13. The apparatus of claim 9, wherein the first proof onion further includes a digital signature of a cryptlet in which code for that transaction was executed.
 14. A method, comprising: storing proof structures for transactions for smart contracts; in response to a proof request that is associated with at least a first transaction of the transactions, providing a first proof structure that corresponds to the first transaction; via at least one processor, revalidating the first proof structure; and in response to the revalidation of the first proof structure, providing at least an indication of the validity of the first transaction.
 15. The method of claim 14, wherein the proof request includes a transaction hash, wherein revalidating the first proof structure includes retrieving the first proof structure, wherein retrieving the first proof structure includes locating the first proof structure based on the transaction hash, and wherein the transaction hash is a hash of at least the first proof structure.
 16. The method of claim 14, the actions further including: receiving a second proof structure from a contract proxy; calculating a hash based at least in part on the second proof structure; storing the second proof structure; indexing the second proof structure based on the hash; and communicating the hash to the contract proxy.
 17. The method of claim 14, wherein details of the transactions are stored on blockchains separate from the proof structures, and wherein the proof structures include a plurality of signatures.
 18. The method of claim 17, wherein the plurality of signatures includes at least one enclave signature from a first enclave, and wherein the first enclave is a secure execution environment.
 19. The method of claim 18, wherein the first proof structure further includes a blockchain-specific signature.
 20. The method of claim 18, wherein the first proof structure further includes a digital signature of a cryptlet in which code for the transaction was executed. 